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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS 
ADMIRAI/l'Y-WORKMEN'S CoMPENSA'l'ION-lS A HYDROPLANE, A VESSEL?-
Claimant was employed in the care and management of a hydroplane which 
was moored in navigable waters. The hydroplane began to drag anchor and 
drift toward the beach, where it was in danger of being wrecked. Claimant 
waded into the water and was struck by the propeller. Held, claimant is 
not entitled to compensation under' the Workmen's Compensation Law, since 
a hydroplane while on navigable waters is a vessel, and therefore the juris-
diction of the admiralty excludes that of the State Industrial Commission. 
Reinhardt v. Newport Flying Service Corp. (N. Y., 1921), 133 N. E. 371. 
The question to be determined was whether the claimant was injured 
by a vessel, for if he was the jurisdiction of the admiralty excludes the 
jurisdiction of the commission. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. 
S. 149. The court, in the principal case, points out that the word vessel 
has been interpreted liberally and broadly, including any structure used, or 
capable of being used, for transportation upon the water; for example, a 
canal boat drawn by horses, The Robt. W. Parsons, 191 U. S. 17; a bath 
house upon floats, The P11blic Bath, 61 Fed. 692; or a log raft, The Mary, 
123 Fed. 6o9. On the other hand, although admiralty has extended its juris-
diction in the past so as to meet the needs of commerce, it will not extend 
its jurisdiction so as to include the navigation of the air, and an airplane, 
as such, is. not a subject of maritime jurisdiction. The Crawford Bros. No. 
2, 215 Fed. 269. Since a hydroplane is capable of being used for transpor-
tation upon the water or through the air, the court concludes that it is a 
vessel subject to admiralty jurisdiction while "it is in the fulfilment of its 
function as a traveler through the water, and has put aside its functions 
and capacities as a traveler through the air." 
APPEAL AND ERROR-CHARGE TO ]URY-PROXIMA'l'E CAus:i>.-Action for 
damages for personal injuries to plaintiff while attempting 'to board defend-
ant's car. The car was suddenly started, and plaintiff was injured by strik-
ing the rear of a truck parked with a space of 16 inches between the rear 
of the truck and the car. Defendant claimed that, as the conductor had no 
knowledge that the truck was parked in the street, he could not anticipate 
that this accid·ent would probably happen by the sudden starting of the car 
before plaintiff was safely aboard, and so his act was not the proximate 
cause of the injury. Held, sufficient that he should reasonably have antici-
pated that some injury might probably result, but judgment for plaintiff 
reversed for error in instruction as to proximate cause. Kausch v. Chifago 
& Milwaukee Electric Ry. Co. (Wis.), 186 N. W. 257. 
This is one of those cases that make the Jack Cades want to kill all 
the lawyers and that cause outcries against the courts as tribunals of injus-
tice. The action began (1) in the civil court of Milwaukee County, verdict 
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for plaintiff of $2000, (2) appeal to circuit court, (3) appeal to supreme 
court, reversed and remanded, (4) new trial in circuit court, judgment for 
$6soo, set aside and new trial ordered, (5) second 11ew trial in circuit court, 
judgment for $6coo, (6) appeal to supreme court, reversed and remanded. 
It may be assumed that if plaintiff is not worn out there will be at least 
(7) third new trial in circuit court, and (8) third appeal to supreme court. 
And all for what reason? As to the present reversal, because, although the 
jury had answered "no" to the question, "Did the plaintiff at said time fail 
to use ordinary care for his own safety and thereby proximately contribute 
to produce his injury?" the judge in defining proximate cause included the 
phrase, "It likewise must have been the cause of the result without any 
other outside cause coming in to interfere and produce the result." This 
would shut out concurrent causes, which could do defendant no harm in 
this case, and also contributory acts of plaintiff. As the jury had already 
found defendant negligent, it would preclude also finding plaintiff negligent. 
At this day, after the thousands of cases involving and defining proximate 
cause, it is certainly a serious reflection on the administration of justice that 
a suitor on his sixth appearance in court should find that his action must 
start all over for error in definition of the most familiar terms in damages. 
the more so since in this case the judge had elsewhere correctly defined 
proximate cause, and the facts are so very simple, were so many times 
passed upon by juries, and always with the same result. On all the circum-
stances of this case, could the court find any probability that a different ver-
dict would have been found if the correct definition of proximate cause 
which was already before the jury had been repeated here? If not, then 
this sliglit change should not have been held reversible error. Legal defini-
tion has sometimes been carried to such a complicated nicety as to conceal 
rather than reveal meaning, and to become a mere pitfall for the suitor in 
quest of justice rather than a light leading to the goal of legal procedure, 
justice. 
APPEAL AND ERROR-GENERAL FINDING OF COURT WITHOUT JURY NOT 
REvmwABLE.-In an action to recover penalties for the viohtion of a certain 
federal statute the trial court found as a fact that the defendant company 
was not engaged in interstate commerce and therefore not subject to the 
act upon which the complaint was based. A statute provided that findings 
of the court upon the facts should have the same effect as the verdict of a 
jury. The question was whether or not this finding of the court could be 
reviewed on appeal. Held, the finding of the trial court was conclusive and 
there was nothing to review. United States v. Colttmbia & N. R. Co., 274 
Fed. 625. 
On appeal in equity, findings of fact made by the court below are entitled 
to some weight, but are not binding upon the appellate court. The whole 
case is before the latter court,. and it must decide the same on its merits. 
Quigley v. Bean~, 137 Ky. 325. In an action at law, findings of the trial 
court are placed on the same footing as the verdict of a jury, even in the 
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absence of a statute to that effect, and are considered conclusive on appeal. 
4 CORPUS Jurus, 876, and cases there cited. Where, however, there is no 
evidence in support of a finding the appellate court may set it aside. Hart-
ford v. Poindexter, 84 Conn. 121; Hedge v. Williams, 131 Cal. 455. The 
converse of this proposition is that where there is conflicting evidence the 
findings of the trial court will not be disturbed. Baster v. New York, etc., 
Ry. Co., 214 Mass. 323. An Ontario court denies that the findings of fact 
made by the trial court stand upon the same footing as the verdict of a 
jury, and holds that the appellate court may come to a different conclusion 
and act upon it. Bate11ta111 v. County of Middlesex, 6 D. L. R. 533. Several 
American states have by statute provided that in actions at law the findings 
of fact made-by the trial court may be reviewed. North and South Dakota 
have such statutes. 3 ANN. CASES, 686. The South Dakota court in con-
struing the statute has held that in reviewing the evidence the appellate 
court will not pass upon the weight of the evidence, as a trial court may do, 
but will only reverse the finding where it is contrary to a clear preponder-
ance of the evidence. Randall v. B11rk Township, 4 S. Dak. 337. By the 
statute in Washington the appellate court must examine de novo the evi-
dence upon which the :finding is based. Allen v. Swerdfiger, 14 Wash. 461. 
In Wisconsin it was formerly provided by statute that upon appeal in a 
case tried by a court without a jury the appellate court should review qud-
tions of fact as well as of, law, and it was held to be the duty of the court 
to examine and weigh the evidence and to reverse the judgment if it was 
found there was a preponderance of evidence in favor of the appellant. 
Snyder v. Wright, 13 Wis. 689. A subsequent statute provided that the 
appellate court should give judgment according to the right of the cause, 
regardless of the decision below, and the statute was held invalid in so far 
as it made it the duty of the supreme court to decide questions as a court 
of original jurisdiction. Klei1i v. Valerius, 87 Wis. 54. 
BROKERS-COMPENSATION-REFUSAL OF PURCHASER TO PERFORM.-P 
employed D, a real estate broker, "to find a purchaser" for his property. 
D found a purchaser who was accepted by P, an oral agreement was made, 
and the purchaser made a small payment. A week later the buyer changed 
his mind and refused to purchase the property. D refused to turn over 
to P the payment which had been made, claiming it as his commission. 
On suit by P, it was held that D had found a purchaser within the meaning 
of the contract and was entitled to the payment as his commission. Jutras 
v. Boisvert (Me., 1921), 115 Atl. 517. 
· The duty of a broker employed to find a purchaser is performed when 
he has found one who is ready, willing and able to purchase upon the terms 
specified. 2 MECHEM, AGENCY, § 2430, and cases there cited. The principal 
case raises the question of when one is "found" within the meaning of this 
rule. It is generally held that there need be no binding contract between 
the vendor and the purchaser if the latter is ready to perform. Allgood v. 
Fahrney, 164 Ia. 540; M cD011ald v. Smith, 99 Minn. 42. And if, under these 
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circumstances, the sale is not consummated because of the default of the 
vendor the broker is still entitled to his commission. Dworski v. Lowe, 88 
Conn. 555. If a binding contract has been entered into between the vendor 
and the purchaser, and the purchaser defaults, the broker may still take his 
commission. Fox v. Ryan, 240 Ill. 39r; Payne v. Ponder, 139 Ga. 283. But 
it will be noted that in the principal case there was no binding contrac't and 
the purchaser defaulted. The court quoted from several cases in support 
of its decision, but in all of them it was the vendor who defaulted and not 
the purchaser. The reasoning of such cases would not seem to apply when 
the purchaser defaults. Parker v. Walker, 86 Tenn. 566; Platt v. Kohler, 
65 Hun (N. Y.) 557; Simrall v. Artlmr, 13 Ky. L. Rep. 682. On facts sim-
ilar to those of the principal case it seems to be generally held that the 
broker is entitled to no commission. Kronenberger v. Bierling, 76 N. Y. S. 
895; Hildenbrand v. Lillis, IO Colo. App. 522; Wilson v. Mason, 158 Ill. 304 
(dictum); Griffith v. Bradford (Tex.), 138 S. W. 1072. But see Heinrich v. 
Kam, 4 Daly's Rep. (N. Y.) 74- This is especially true if the broker was 
authorized "to procure an exchange," Lanham v. Cockrell (Tex.), 152 S. 
\V. 189; or was to be paid when the property was sold. Pfanz v. Humburg, 
82 Ohio St. l; Parmly v. Head, 33 Ill. App. 134- It would seem, conse-
quently, that the principal case is contrary to the weight of authority, and 
it is submitted that the holding defeats the intent of the vendor, which prob-
ably was to pay the broker only if a purchaser was produced who would 
actually consummate the sale or who would so bind himself by contract 
that he would be liable if he did not do so. If, however, it can be truly said 
that the vendor accepted the purchaser and assumed the risk of his failure 
to perform, then the latter's subsequent default should not affect the broker's 
right to his commission, and the case would seem correctly decided. 
~ 
C.ARRmRS-DEI.IViiRY Mus'!' BE To RIGH'l' PAR'l'Y.-Plaintiff had in his 
emplQ¥ a traveling salesman who turned in fictitious orders on which goods 
were shipped by the plaintiff to the firms supposed to have ordered them. 
The plaintiff's salesman, by some means not disclosed by the evidence, got 
possession of the bill of lading, which he presented to the defendant, and 
he having executed receipts in his own name as agent for the consignee, 
the goods were delivered to him. Plaintiff "sued for conversion. Held, as 
the goods were not delivered to either of the consignees named in the non-
negotiable bill of lading, or to a person lawfully entitled to the possession 
of the goods, as required not only by the common law but by §§ 4624 and 
4625, G. S., in the Uniform Bill of Lading Act, the defendant was liable. 
Hartford Distillery Co. v. New York, etc., Ry. Co. (Conn., l92I), n5 Atl. 488. 
The common carrier, like any other bailee, must upon the termination 
of the bailment dispose of the bailed property in accordance with directions 
of the bailor; and no circumstance of fraud, imposition or mistake will 
excuse the carrier from liability for delivery to the wrong person. 2 Hu'l'CH. 
ON CAR. 739; The fraud may, however, be such that for purposes of d~livery 
the impostor is the right party. Where the fraud is upon the carrier, as in 
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the case of goods delivered to one under a forged order, the rule is uniform 
that the fraud furnishes no excuse. 37 L. R. A. 177 and cases there cited. 
Where the fraud is upon the consignor, however, the cases are in conflict. 
A typical case is- where a swindler assumes the name of a reputable person, 
and orders goods in the name of that person, which are delivered by the 
carrier to the impostor. In such a case is the right party the one with 
whom the consignor carried on the correspondence, or the person whose 
name the swindler assumed? One line of cases holds the right party to be 
the person whose name was assumed. Pacific Express Co. v. Shearer, 16o 
Ill. 215; Americaii Express Co. v. Fletcher, 25 Ind. 492. Another line of 
cases holds the right party to be the one with whom the consignor carried 
on the correspondence. Samuel v. Cheney, 135 Mass. 278; The Drew, IS 
Fed. 826. The court in Samitel v. Cheney, sitpra, saying, "we think the more 
correct statement is that the consignor intends to send the goods to the man 
who ordered them and agreed to pay for them, supposing erroneously that 
he was Arthur Swannick." The above rule is qualified to the e.'Ctent that 
if the carrier, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known 
that a fraud was being perpetrated upon the consignor he will be held liable 
for delivering to the impostor. L. & N. Railroad Co. v. Fort Wayne Elec-
tric Co., 1o8 Ky. II3; 2 HUTCH. ON CAR. 750. And the carrier cannot exempt 
itself from liability for this negligence by special contract. In W estem 
U11io1i Telegraph Co. v. Lape1111a (Ind., 1921), 133 N. E. 144, money was 
sent with the understanding that the defendant could deliver the money to 
"such person as its agent believed to be the above named payee." Defendant 
contended that it was absolved from liability upon payment to one whom 
its agent in fact believed to be the payee, even though by the exercise of 
due care the agent should have known otherwise. But the court held that 
notwithstanding the waiver of identification the carrier was bound to exer-
cise reasonable care. As the carrier in the principal case was the one fraud-
ulently imposed upon, and it failed to deliver to the right party, the fraud 
constituted no defense. 
CARRIERS-WRITTEN NOTICE OF CLAIM OF DAMAGES BY INJURED PASSEN-
GER.-Action for personal injuries to plaintiff, who was riding on a driver's 
pass, caused by a collision on defendant's road. In consideration of the pass 
plaintiff agreed that the carrier should not be liable for personal injury 
unless notice in writing of the claim was sent to the general manager within 
thirty days after injury. Defendant's claim agent called on plaintiff in a 
hospital where he was being treated for his injuries, but plaintiff said he 
was not in condition to talk to him. No written notice was given. Held, 
the requirement of notice in writing was valid, and there could be no recov-
ery. Gooch v. Oregon Short Line R. Co. (U. -S., Feb. 27, 1922). 
After such decisions as So. Pac. Co. v. Stewart, 248 U. S. 446, 17 MICH. 
L. REv. 420, it seems strange that such a question as the present should be 
carried to the Supreme Court of the United States; stranger still that it 
should be decided with three justices dissenting. That such regnlations are 
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reasonable at common law was past dispute, and the Cummins Act of 1915, 
which_ changed the common law so as to forbid any lesser period than ninety 
, days for giving notice of losses of goods, made no reference to injuries to 
passengers. This is natural, for the Cummins Act was dealing only with 
injuries to goods. The court divided on the question whether the Cummins 
Act showed a changed public policy on the whole question of the period 
within which notice must be given. On this the majority held that the 
silence of the statute as to cases of passengers was conclusive; that there 
had been no change in the policy of the law. The dissenting judges say: 
"The Cummins Amendment is the protest of the country against the dis-
crimination and hardship which many federal and state court decisions 
show to have resulted all over the country, from the enforcement of such 
a rule as to property claims.'' They do not agree with the prevailing opinion 
that there is less need of time for filing claims for personal injuries. On 
the contrary, injured men are likely to need more time, and the court should 
accept the public policy prescribed by Congress and apply it to personal 
injury claims. This extension of the operation of a statute by applying 
changed policies of law it is supposed to reflect to cases not covered by the 
statute is an interesting door to judicial legislation that may not be entered 
in this note. 
CoNSTI'!UTIONAL LAW-GRAND JURY-SUFFRAGE AMENDMENT Dm~s NO'.l' 
G~ WOMEN THI') RIGHT To SERVE ON GRAND JuRY'.-The grand jury which 
returned the indictment against the defendant was composed of ten men 
and two women. The code provided that the grand jury should· be com-
posed of ten men. Defendant moved to quash the indictment on the ground 
that the grand jury was not properly constituted. Plaintiff contended that 
the Nineteenth Amendment entitled women to perform jury service. Held, 
indictment should be dismissed, as the right or duty to serve on the grand 
jury should not be confounded with the right to vote. Stroud v. State 
(Tex. C. C. A., 1921), 235 S. W. 214 
A jury at common law was "twelve good men and true.'' 3 Br,ACK. 
COMM. 349. "Under the word homo, though a name common to both sexes, 
the female was, however, excluded, propter defectmn se:rns," e.."\:cept where 
a writ of de ventre inspiciendo was issued. This common law idea as to the 
qualifications of a juror has been universally followed under the American 
constitutions. Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U. S. 1. The passing of 
the suffrage amendments have, however, raised the question as to whether 
or not the common law rule that women were not eligible for jury service 
still prevails. One line of cases holds that where a certain class has been 
designated from which jurors are to be chosen, and women are subsequently 
brought within that class by a change in the law, they automatically become 
liable for jury service. People v. Barltz, 180 N. W. 423; Parus v. Dist. 
Court, 42 Nev. 229. Other cases, however, have held that women are not 
entitled to perform jury service, even though they were subsequently brought 
within the class from which jurors are selected. bi re Opinion of tlze ltes-
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tices (Mass., 1921), 130 N. E. 685; Harland v. Territory of Washington, 3 
Wash. Ter. 131. In other cases where jury service is expressly confined to 
men, and the question has arisen, as in the principal case, whether the right . 
to vote entitles women to perform jury service, the courts have all held that 
it does not, on the ground that jury service was not incidental to and a part 
of suffrage. fo re Grilli, 179 N. Y. Sup. 795; Harper v. State (Tex. C. C. 
A, 1921), 234 S. W. 909. See also the Opinion of the h'stices, supra. The 
contention was advanced in these cases that to deny women the right to 
perform jury service under the Nineteenth Amendment was contrary to the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and the cases of Strauder v. West Virginia, IOO 
U. S. 303, and Ex- parte Virginia, roo U. S. 339, were cited. The contention 
should have but little weight, for here the basis for exclusion was sex and 
not color. As was said in Strauder v. West Virginia, supra, "we do not 
deny that a state may prescribe the qualifications of its jurors and in so 
doing make discriminations. It may confine the selections to males, to free-
holders, to citizens, etc. We do not believe the Fourteenth Amendment was 
ever intended to prohibit that." This dictum seems 11ound, as the perform· 
ance of jury service is not a civil right, but a political right, which is quali-
fied because its exercise depends upon fitness, which is to be adjudged by 
the legislature. The cases reviewed indicate that the conflict in the cases 
is confined to a question of constitutional construction. Where a class is 
designated from which jurors are to be selected, is the class limited to those 
who meet its requirements at the time the provision was adopted, or does 
it include those brought within the class by a subsequent change in the law? 
The former interpretation would undoubtedly effectuate the specific intent 
of the framers of the Constitution. But it would seem that where the law 
has designated electors as the class from which jurors are to be chosen, and 
women are subsequently made members of that class, they should be entitled 
to perform jury service. 
CoN'J.'RAC'ts-ILLEGALI'l'Y-PRovrs10N 'l'HA'J.' ANY ACTION ON 'l'Ht CoN'l'RAC't 
SHALL Bt BROUGHT ONLY IN A CERTAIN PLACE.-The plaintiff brought action 
in county R on a contract containing a stipulation that any action upon it 
should be brought in the city of Charlotte, located in county M. Independent 
of the stipulation, the venue might properly have been laid in either county. 
The motion of the defendant to have the cause removed to county M was 
denied. Gaither v. Charlotte Motor Car Co. (N. C., 1921), 109 S. E. 362. 
The great majority of American courts hold invalid and unenforceable 
provisions in a contract to the effect that any action upon it shall be brought 
only in a certain place or court. Nute v. Hamilton Insur. Co., 6 Gray (Mass.), 
1_74; Hall v. Muhial Insur. Co., 6 Gray (Mass.) 185; Nashua River Paper 
Co. v. Hammermill Paper _Co., 223 Mass. 8, and note, L. R. A. 1916 D 69(5; 
Shipping Co. v. Lehman, 39 Fed. 704. The court in the leading American 
case declared that it placed no great reliance upon considerations of public 
policy. Nute v. Hamilton Insur. Co., supra. Nevertheless, the rule is usu-
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ally supported on the ground that a stipulation which ousts the courts of 
jurisdiction is against public policy. Shipping Co. v. Lehman, supra; Mutual 
Reserve Fund L. Ass1i. v. Cleveland W oolm Mills, 82 Fed. 508. This latter 
doctrine has been supported loyally. fo.mrance Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445; 
Jefferso1i Fire Insur. Co. v. Bierce & Sage, foe., 183 Fed. 588; Meacham v. 
Jamestown, F. & C. R.R. Co., 2II N. Y. 346. But its soundness is open to 
attack. U. S. Asphalt R. Co. v. Trinidad Lake P. Co., 222 Fed: 1006. In a 
few instances, where the convenience of the parties made particularly rea-
sonable the stipulation that action should be brought only in a certain place, 
the courts have recognized the circumstances as exceptional and have held 
the stipulation to be valid. Mittent!zal v. Mascagni, I83 Mass. I9; Daley v. 
People's B1tilding, etc., Assn., I78 Mass. 13. The English courts have fre-
quently enforced such stipulations, refusing to take jurisdiction of a case 
where the parties had agreed to sue only in a foreign court. Gimar v. 
ilfeyer, 2 H. BI. 6o3; Jolmsoii v. Machielseii, 3 Campb. 44; Kirchner v. 
Grnban, [1909] I Ch. 4I3. Accord: Dulmage v. White, 4 Ont. L. Rep. 121. 
A few cases in America have held that a stipulation like that of the prin-
cipal case entitled the party defendant to have the cause removed to the 
place agreed upon. Texas Moline Plow Co. v. Biggerstaff (Tex. Civ. App.), 
I85 S. W. 341; Merchants' Reciprocal Underwriters v. First Natl. Bank 
(Texas Civ. App.), I92 S. W. 1098. See also State v. Superior Court, 6I 
·wash. 68I. In view of the customary liberality of the law regarding the 
right to contract, it is doubtful whether public policy requires that such stip-
ulations be held invalid. 
EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY OF DYING DF.Cr.ARA'l.'ION.-In the trial on indict-
ment for murder, the court admitted as a dying declaration, over the objec-
tion of the· defendant, a statement written by the deceased. The only state-
ment made by the deceased prior to the execution of the writing, indicating 
that he was in fear of impending death, is found in these words: "If I am 
going to die, I want to see my minister." Subsequently to making the state-
ment admitted as a dying declaration, he wrote a note to his friends stating 
that he was feeling fine and hoped to be with them soon. Held, the admis-
sion of the declaration was error. State v. Brooks, I86 N. W. 46 (1922, 
Iowa). 
The court in the principal case held that it is for the court to determine 
the competency of the statement claimed to be a dying declaration and its 
credibility upon admission is for the jury. That the judge is to pass on 
the preliminary conditions necessary to the admissibility of the evidence is 
generally accepted. It follows that, since a consciousness of impending death 
is essential to its admissibility, the judge must determine whether that con-
dition exists before the declaration is admitted. 2 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, 
1451. And in most of the states it is held that the decision of the court 
or judge on this subject is final and conclusive and that with it the jury has 
nothing more to do. Tarver v. State, 137 Ala. 29; Fogg v. State, 8I Ark. 
417; Brennan v. People, 37 Colo. 256; Williams v. State, 168 Ind. 87; State 
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v. Monich, 74 N. J. L. 522. In Georgia and Massachusetts, however, an 
entirely different rule prevails, and it has been there held that while the 
question is primarily one for the court, yet, after the evidence has been 
admitted, it is not only the right but the duty of the jury to find whether 
a proper foundation has been laid. Com. v. Brewer, 164 Mass. 577; A11der-
so1i v. State, II7 Ga. 255; also see note 16, L. R. A. (n. s.) 66o. California, 
Iowa and Oregon seem to have followed this rule also. People v. Thomson, 
145 Cal. 717; State v. Phillips, II8 Ia. 660; State of Oregon. v. Doris, 94 Pac. 
44. Thus the court in the principal case follows the general rule as to this 
question of admissibilit:ii and consequently reverses the prior Iowa. decisions 
following the Massachusetts and Georgia rule. It is to be noted, however, 
that the court cites no authority to support its decision and makes no refer-
ence whatever to the prior Iowa decisions. 
EvmSNCE-INSANITY-BURDEN OF PROOF.-On a trial for murder the 
defense was insanity. A confession: of the accused was admitted in evidence 
over the objection that it was not freely and voluntarily made. Held, the 
· burden of proof is on the defendant pleading insanity to prove his legal 
incapacity to commit the crime and consequently his legal incapacity to con-
fess the crime. Hin.son v. State (Ga., 1922), 109 S. E. 66I. 
The opinion contains no discussion on principle. All authorities agree 
that the prosecution can rest upon a presumption of sanity until evidence to 
the contrary is introduced. There is, however, considerable conflict as to 
where the burden of proof lies. One view is that insanity is a question of 
responsibility and while the burden of going forward with the evidence is 
upon the defendant, the prosecution is, nevertheless, not relieved from prov-
ing all the essential elements of the offense, one of which is sanity. People 
v. Garb"tt, 17 Mich. 9. The rule of the principal case, and what is perhaps 
the rule in the majority of the jurisdictions, regards insanity as an affirm-
ative defense and the burden of proving it is upon the defendant. See note 
to State v. Scott, 36 L. R. A. 721, 726. But it does not follow, as the court 
would seem to indicate, that because the burden is upon the defendant to 
prove insanity as a defense it is likewise incumbent upon him to prove a 
legal incapacity to confess the crime. The general rule is that a confession 
of guilt is admissible against the accused only when freely and voluntarily 
made. The ordinary presumption is said to be that it was so made. Camp-
bell v. State, 63 Tex. Cr. 595; contra, Godait v. State, 179 Ala. 27. When 
it appears prima facie that the confession was voluntary, the burden of going 
forward with the evidence upon this issue of voluntariness is upon the 
defendant. Sims v. State, 59 Fla. 38. The rule fixing the burden of proof 
is iJl dispute. I WlGMORE ON EVIDENCE, § 860. The rule in England and 
most American jurisdictions is that the burden is upon the prosecution to 
show the confession to have been voluntary. The King v. Voisin, [1918] l 
K. B. 531; Lindsay v. State, so L. R. A. (n. s.) 1077, 1o81. The rule in 
Georgia is contra and places on the defendant the burden of proving that a 
confession made by him is not free and voluntary. Eberhart v. State, 47 
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Ga. 598. There is a distinction to be noted between insanity as a defense 
and as going to the free and voluntary character of a confession. It is quite 
conceivable that the defendant may have been in full possession of his facul-
ties at the time the crime was alleged to have been committed, yet have 
become insane before making the confession. Had the defendant in the 
principal case been proved to have been insane at the time the confession 
was made the question w:ould then have arisen whether the insanity went 
to the free and voluntary character of the confession so as to render it 
inadmissible. No case on this bare point appears to have been decided, but 
it would seem best to dispose of it by analogy to a case of intoxication, 
treating the extent of the insanity and its effect upon the mind as questions 
to be submitted to the jury along with the confession, to be considered by 
them in determining its weight. See note to Lindsay v. State, supra. 
EVIDENCE-NOT ERROR FOR PROSECUTOR 'tO WITHDRAW "\V'.l:TNESS AND PRI-
VATE!.¥ REFRESH Hrs R:ecoLLECTION.-ln a criminal prosecution a witness 
who had testified before the grand jury manifested a hazy recollection. The 
prosecutor was permitted to withdraw the witness and refresh her memory 
as to her previous testimony. No actual prejudice appearing, it was held 
not to be error. State v. Henson (Mo., 1921), 234 S. W. 832. 
It is well settled that previous testimony may be used to refresh a wit-
ness's recollection. State v. Martin, 94 N. J. L. 139; I WrGMORE ON EVI-
DENCE, § 737. The prior testimony, however, should not be read in the pres-
ence of the jury. State v. Walters, 145 La. 209; Kirkland v. State, 86 Tex. 
Cr. R. 595; State v. DePriest (Mo.), 232 S. W. 83. The regular method of 
refreshing the witness's memory in this way, as is stated in the principal 
case, ill to withdraw the jury. With the privileges which the law gives by 
way of various methods of stimulating the recollection of_ a witness while 
on the witness stand, there would seem to be no reason except a sinister 
one for withdrawing a witness to refresh recollection. The method adopted 
in the instant case lends itself too conveniently to the coaching of an unscru-
pulous witness by an unscrupulous attorney not te be viewed with suspicion. 
It would not be surprising to find an appellate court presuming prejudice 
and directing a new trial. 
EvrnENCE-OPINroN BY AN ExPERT WITNESS ON "THE VERY Issu.:e" 
INADMISSIBLE.-In a dentistry malpractice case the testimony of a family 
physician, who saw the operation complained of, that it was unskillful, was 
admitted. Held, reversible error as invading the jury's province. Patterson 
v. Howe (Ore., 1922), 202 Pac. 225. 
"\Vhile a general rule e.'Ccluding opinion evidence may have been desir-
able, it was inevitable that there should result a relaxation necessitated by 
the practical conditions under which trials are had. It frequently happens 
in practice that the "facts whicJt surround a question are so complicated or 
so technical that the jury may not be able to grasp them or draw the proper 
inference. The principle, then, upon which opinion evidence by experts 
became admissible was assistance to the jury. The limit upon this admissi-
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bility, according to one view, was whether or not the opinion was expressed 
upon the exact question which the jury was required to decide. If it was, 
the evidence was inadmissible. Yost v. Conroy, 92 Ind. 464 The principal 
case affirms this rule and there is authority for the decision in Lehman v. 
Knott (Ore., 1921), lg6 Pac. 476, and in Pointer v. Klamath Falls Land Co., 
59 Ore. 438, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 1076. The reason of the rule is that such 
opinions usurp the functions of the jury. The court observed that if the 
jury believed the testimony of the witness and had confidence in his judg-
ment then nothing remained for it to do except to determine what the amount 
of the damages should be. Where the only practicable method of making 
proof of the fact in issue is by means of opinion evidence, it is doubtful 
whether the Oregon court would adhere to the doctrine of the principal case. 
See Lehmati v. Knott, supra. Many cases have held that opinion evidence 
may be given upon the very issue. Amrrican Agricultural Chemical Society 
v. Hoga1i, 213 Fed. 416; Cook v. Doud Sons & Co., 147 Wis. 271; Poole v. 
Dean, 152 Mass. 589; Taylor v. Kidd, 72 Wash. 18. See also 20 MICH. L. 
~.36o. 
!NNKEEPtts-L1ABILI'tY 'to ONJ~ WHo RJ>soR'tS To INN FOR UNLAWRJL 
PURPOSE.-Plaintiff on invitation of a guest was going to the latter's room 
at defendant's inn to play cards for money. The elevator was in a dark 
place and the door to the: shaft was open while the carriage was on another 
floor. For injuries received from stepping through the door and falling 
nine or ten feet down the shaft plaintiff sued defendant innkeeper. Held, 
that one entering an inn for an unlawful purpose is not an invitee, but a 
mere trespasser to whom the innkeeper owes no duty except not to wilfully 
or wantonly injure him. Jones v. Bland (N. C., 1921), 108 S. E. 344. 
It has been held that an innkeeper is not liable as such for money depos-
ited with the night clerk by one who took a room at the inn for the night 
for an unlawful purpose. Ciertis v. Murphy, 63 Wis. 4- The instant case 
extends this rule to one invited to the inn by a guest, not as to the loss of 
money or property, as to which defendant would of course not be an inn-
keeper even if the purpose of the visit were lawful, but as to the care owed 
such an invitee for his personal safety, as to which the innkeeper's liability 
does not differ from that to a guest. It would seem that a guest, or his 
invitee, becomes a trespasser when he enters the inn for any unlawful pur-
pose. The recent case of Newcomb Hotel Co. v. Corbett (Ga. App., 1921), 
108 S. E. 309, puts a proper limit on the innkeeper in holding that he acts 
at his peril in entering a room occupied by one registered as a guest in order 
to determine whether the occupant is there for a lawful purpose. 
!NSURANCE-DEA'l'H BY SUNSTROKE IS Accm:EN'tAL.-Plaintiff sued as 
beneficiary under a policy of insurance issued by defenoant company to the 
plaintiff's deceased husband, insuring him against "loss resulting from bodily 
injuries effected directly, exclusively and independently of all other causes, 
through accidental means." The insured was overcome by sunstroke while 
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returning on foot from a mining claim, and died as a result. Held, that 
death by sunstroke was accidental within the meaning of the policy. Rich-
ards v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co. (Utah, 1921), 200 Pac. 1017. 
The court seems to rest its decision on the ground that sunstroke is 
popularly considered as an accident, and, although technically it is a disease, 
the words in an insurance policy must be understood in their plain, ordinary 
and popular sense rather than their scientific meaning. And since the words 
must have been considered in their ordinary popular sense by the insured 
when he took out the policy, their meaning must be held to be the same when 
the policy is sued on. The authorities are not in harmony on this question, 
but there seems to be a tendency in the later decisions to hold that death 
by sunstroke is accidental. In Sinclair v. Maritime Passengers Assurance 
Co., 3 Ell. & Ell. 478, it was held that sunstroke was a disease, and hence 
there could be no recovery under a policy insuring against accident. This 
case was followed in Cont. Cas. Co. v. Pittman, 145 Ga. 641, where it was 
held that sunstroke incurred while insured was performing his ordinary 
duties as fireman on a locomotive was not an accident. To the same effect 
is Dozier v. Fidelity and Cas. Co. of N. Y., 461 Fed. 446. In accord with the 
principal case are Bryant v. Cont. Cas. Co., 107 Tex. 582; Higgitis v. Midland 
Cas. Co., 281 Ill. 431, and Railway Oflicials v. Johnson, 109 Ky. 261. Jolmso1i 
v. Fidelity and Gas. Ca. of N. Y., 184 Mich. 4o6, is in accord on principle, 
although the facts were somewhat different. In that case it was held that 
death as a result of ptomaine poisoning is covered by an accident policy 
providing for payment in case insured comes to his death as a result of an 
accident. See also a note in L. R. A. 1916 E 957. The Higgins case, supra, 
is commented on in 16 MICH. L. REv. 453, and 13 ILL. L. Rsv. 133. 
IN'l'ERS'l'A'l'e COMMER.CE Co~o.r1ss10N-PowER OVER IN'l'RAS'l.'A'l'E RA'rr:s.-
Acting under the Transportation Act of 1920, , the Interstate Commerce 
Commission ordered the railroads in a group, of which the Wisconsin roads 
were a part, to increase freight and passenger rates to a point considerably 
above rates allowed on intrastate traffic. Thereupon the carriers applied to 
the Wisconsin Railroad Commission for corresponding increases. That com-
mission denied any increases in passenger fares on the ground that the 
state statute limited such fares to two cents a mile. From an interlocutory 
injunction granted to the railroads to enjoin the state commission from 
interfering with the maintenance of the fares ordered by the Interstate 
Commerce Commission the case was taken to the Supreme Court of the 
United States on appeal. Held, that the passenger fares limited by the Wis-
consin statute are an "undue, unreasonable and unjust discrimination against 
interstate and foreign commerce" under the Transportation Act of 1920, 
which may be removed by the order of the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion. Railroad Commi.ssio1~ of Wisconsin v. C., B. & Q. R. Co. (U. S., Feb. 
27, 1922). 
This case, known as Wisconsin Passenger Fares, 59 I. C. C. 391, and a 
New York case decided the same day, State of New York v. U. S. et al., 
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which was an outgrowth of what is known as E:i: parte 74 Increased Rates, 
58 I. C. C. 220, are the logical development of Tlze Illinois Central Case, 
245 U. S. 493, 16 MICH. L. REY. 379. In the last mentioned note it was said 
that the Illinois Central Case is evidently not the last, but the war delayed 
for some years the issue which now again arises between the states and the 
federal government. The present case expressly denies that the decision 
involves giving the federal commission general regul!ltion of intrastate com-
merce, but does reiterate the view of the Minnesota Rate Case, 230 U. S. 
352, 399, that the power to regulate interstate commerce "is not to be denied 
or thwarted by the commingling of interstate and intrastate operations." 
So far, at least, as concerns rates it would seem there is practically no right 
left in the state which may not be considered by Congress as affecting inter-
state commerce, and so subject to federal control. Specifically, the court 
decides, first, that the order of the commission is much wider than the 
orders in the Shreveport and Illinois Central cases, in that it includes all 
rates and fares in the states. It was a: horizontal increase of them all. Such 
an order "should not be given precedence over a state rate statute, other-
wise valid, unless, and except so far as, it conforms to a high standard of 
certainty," quoting from the Illinois Central case. The intrastate fares as 
a whole were found to be an undue discrimination against interstate com-
merce, for they so reduced the revenue necessary to yield a fair return to 
the companies as to require a heavy increase in interstate rates to offset this 
loss. The lower the intrastate the higher the interstate rates must be. The 
court therefore upholds the power of the Interstate Commerce Commission 
to order the increase of intrastate rates, and leaves it to a conference between 
that commission and the state commission to make necessary adjustments 
modifying the horizontal increase. The Transportation Act of 1920 so con-
strued marks another long step in the extension of federal and the restriction 
of state control of agencies of nation-wide activity, and it has already drawn 
vigorous protest from. those who are jealous for local power of control. The 
decision makes a conspicuous effort to show that tliere does remain a sphere 
in intrastate commerce that cannot be entered, or at least completely occupied, 
by the federal control. It is, however, too restricted to furnish much com-
fort to state commissions. 
LAW OF NATIONS-EFFECT OF WAR ON CoNTRACl'S.-In June, 1914, the 
plaintiff, a citizen of the United States residing in Ohio, contracted with 
his son-in-law, Meyer, a German citizen then residing in Ohio, to support 
the latter's children during his absence. Meyer and his wife went to Ger-
many. When war broke out Meyer entered the German army and remained 
abroad until the close of the war. Under Trading with the Enemy Act, 
October 6, 1917, which made it unlawful to trade with the enemy except 
under license from the President, "to trade" included "(c) Enter into, 
carry on, complete or perform any contract, agreement or obligation." Sub-
sequent to this date plaintiff continued to perform the agreement without 
license from the President. Claim was made against assets of :i'i~eyer in the 
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hands of the Alien Property Custodian. Held, that so much of claim as 
accrued subsequent to the passage of the act cannot be allowed. Springer v. 
(iarva11, 276 Fed. 595. 
An early writer on international law intimated that the declaration of 
war put an end to all agreements between subjects of enemy states. GROTIUS, 
DE JuRE BELLI sr PAcis, III, ch. 23, 11 5. Dictum of Kent is to the same 
effect. Griswold v. Waddington (N. Y.), 16 Johns. 438. Judge Story used 
language equally broad. The Julia, 8 Cr. 194. The cases, however, have not 
supported such opinions. Kershaw v. Kelsey, IOO Mass. 561 (President's 
proclamation during Civil War which forbade "commercial intercourse" 
with the enemy, not violated by a lease of Mississippi lands). But contract; 
involving commercial intercourse or communication with the enemy are 
made illegal by the mere operation of the laws of war. The Hoop, l C. 
Rob. 196; The Rapid, 8 Cr. 155· Contracts of necessity, founded on a state 
of war, are the only exceptions. Antoine v. l.forshead, 6 Taunton ·237; I 
HALLECK's INT. LAW (Ed. 4), 582, 583 .. The act in the principal case was 
broader than the proclamation in Kershaw v. Kelsey, supra, and the result 
reached was clearly proper. See also Williams v. Paine, 169 U. S. 55, and 
In re T¥ill of Kielsmark, 188 Iowa 1378. 
NEGLIGENCE-FACT THAT DRIVER. OF DEFENDANT'S CAR DID NOT HAVE AN 
OPERATOR'S LICENSE IS NOT CONCLUSIVE.-Statute required the driver of any 
vehicle to have an operator's license, under pain of fine, unless driver was 
sixteen or over and accompanied by a person with such license. The defend-
ant was being driven in his automobile by a fifteen-year-old employee when 
the car collided with the plaintiff's intestate and killed him. Verdict for the 
defendant. The plaintiff excepted, claiming that an automobile operated on 
the highway by an unlicensed driver is a trespasser and a nuisance and that 
the owner is liable for injuries caused by it, irrespective of the absence of 
negligence in its operation or the presence of contributory negligence. The 
exception was overruled on the ground that the breach of the statute was 
material only to the extent that it as a fact was the proximate cause of the 
injury. Black v. H1111t (Conn., 1921), us Atl. 429. 
In giving its decision the court says : "In doing an unlawful act a per-
son does not necessarily put himself out of the protection, of the law. He 
is not barred of redress for an injury suffered by himself nor liable for an 
injury suffered by another merely because he is a lawbreaker." The court 
distinguishes the Massachusetts cases cited in support of the rule contended 
for from the instant case. In Massachusetts itself, perhaps because of the 
strong criticism by the· other courts, the rule advocated by the plaintiff has 
been restricted in its application to cases involving the operation of unlicensed 
vehicles and has not been followed in unlicensed operator decisions. Bourne 
v. Whitmaii, 209 Mass. 155; Polmatier v. Newbury, 231 Mass. 307. So it is 
generally held, in the absence of eA'"Press statutory language to the contrary, 
that the failure to have an operator's license is not conclusive of negligence. 
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
Moore v. Hart, 171 Ky. 725; Southern Ry. v. Vauglza1i's Admr., n8 Va. 692; 
Hersman v. Roane Coitnty Court, 86 W. Va. g6. Outside of Massachusetts 
it is almost universally held that the fact that the car of one of the pJLrties 
was not licensed does not bar recovery or defense on the merits. Armstead 
v. Lo1msberry, 129 Minn. 34; Moore v. Hart, supra; Southeni Ry. v. Vaitghan, 
s1epra; H ersma1i v. Roane Coitnty Court, supra. In Brose/tart v. T1ettle, 59 
Conn. l, the court clearly points out the error in the Massachusetts Sunday 
law rulings which are the basis of the anomalous Bay State license rule, when 
it says: "The fallacy of the Massachusetts rule consists in assuming that a 
mere concurrence of the illegal act in the point of time is to be treated as 
a concurring cause of the injury, which it is not, but rather a condition or 
incident merely." The principal case does not fail to observe this distinction. 
PARTNtRSHlP-GUARANTY OF BONDS BY A PARTN:ER-BURDJ;N OF PROOF.-
A salesman of the firm of Farson, Son and Co., who carried on the busi-
ness of dealing in stocks and bonds, sold five $rooo bonds of the Eden Irri-
gation and Land Company to the plaintiff, Parnall. The bonds were deliv-
ered March g, 1909. The salesman had been authorized by John Farson, 
Sr., to state that the bonds would be guaranteed by Farson, Son and Co. 
When the bonds were delivered to Parnall there was attached to each bond 
a written guaranty of Farson, Son and Co. of "prompt payment of both 
principal and interest." The firm had also issued a circular in which they 
"unconditionally guaranteed" the bonds. The plaintiff paid ninety-eight cents 
on the dollar and accrued interest for the guaranteed bonds. Bonds without 
the gua;anty were offered at a considerably lower figure. Plaintiff had 
dealt with the firm before and knew them to be financially responsible. 
The defendant firm were owners of the bonds, having purchased the entire 
issue from the Eden Company. The cashier of the firm was the secretary 
and treasurer of the Eden Company. John Farson, Sr., died in January, 
l9IO, and the business was continued under the same firm name by his two 
sons. On December 31, 1912, Farson, Son and Co. notified the plaintiff that 
the Eden Company had no funds to pay maturing interest and principal. 
Thereupon plaintiff demanded payment from the firm on their guaranty. 
The firm then requested the plaintiff to forward to them the coupons 
together with the guaranty. After examination of the guaranty the firm 
paid the coupons due January l, 1913, and returned the guaranty. Farson, 
Son and Co. continued to pay the coupons till October 4, 1916. Since that 
time none have been paid. Held: (1) John Farson, Sr., had actual authority 
to give the guaranty in the firm name. (2) John Farson, Jr., ratified the 
act of guaranty by payment of the coupons "with exact knowledge of the 
contents, tenor, and effect of the written guaranties." (3) It was not error 
to admit "testimony showing that the defendant had paid three-fifths of all 
the bonds issued." Parnall v. Fars01i (N. Y., 1922), 192 N. Y. Supp. 20. 
The decision is so manifestly correct as to the first two points that it 
is somewhat surprising to know that there has been a long drawn out liti-
gation of the matter, the end of which is not yet, as application has been 
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made to prosecute a further appeal to the Court of Appeals on behalf of 
the defendant brokers. In an action on a similar guaranty issued by the 
same firm to the First National Bank of Ann Arbor, Michigan, it was 
decided that there was a presumption of implied authority in John Farson, 
Sr., to guarantee the bonds for the firm and that the burden was upon the 
defendants to give evidence as to whether the guaranty was within the ordi-
nary manner of carrying on the business. 178 App. Div. 135; 165 N. Y. 
Supp. n9. This finding was, however, reversed and a new trial ordered by 
the Court of Appeals, 226 N. Y. 218, which held that the burden of proof 
is upon the purchaser to show that the partner signing the guaranty had 
authority so to do. This is of course in accord with the well-established 
rule that the burden of proof rests on the one asserting the fact. Sibley 
v. Americaii Exchange Bank, 97 Ga. 138, but it was suggested by the lower 
court that inasmuch as the firm was in this instance promoting a sale of its 
own property this in itself "was sufficient to cast upon the defendants the 
burden of rebutting the presumption arising from the evidence and the 
pleadings." J oh11ston v. Trask, n6 N. Y. 143. This argument is, however, 
purely academic since the decision of the Court of Appeals, and, in the 
instant case, the plaintiff has taken upon himself the burden of proof and 
sustains it by giving evidence that the firm was in this instance promoting 
a sale of its own property, as in the previous case, together with other evi-
dence which it is to be hoped will satisfy the Court of Appeals. The ruling 
as to lack of error on the third point seems to be sound, as the evidence 
admitted "had a material bearing on the issues in this action." 
PL-eADING-ADMISSION OF LIAllILI'l'Y FOR PAR'l' NO'l.' BINDING UNLESS 
PLAINTIFF TAKES JUDGMENT BEFORE TRIAL FoR AMouN'l.' ADMI'l'TED.-ln an 
action of assumpsit by a sales agent against an automobile corporation for 
$1392.53 for commissions alleged to be due the plaintiff, the defendant cor-
poration filed a plea of non assumpsit and an affidavit in which it admitted 
$63-33 of the claim to be due the plaintiff for services performed, but dis-
puted the balance. The plaintiff proceeded to trial for the recovery of the 
whole amount. The defendant moved for a directed verdict in its favor, 
but the plaintiff contended that a verdict could not be directed in favor of 
the defendant for the reason that it had admitted, on the pleadings, a part 
of the claim. Helc!, admission of iiability for part of the claim was not 
binding upon the defendant because the plaintiff failed to take judgment 
before trial for the amount admitted. Standard Motor Co. v. Shockey 
(Md., 1921), II4 Atl. 869. 
It is a universal rule that pleadings containing admissions, which are 
signed or sworn to by the pleader, are binding upon him in the action 
wherein they are filed without being specially offered as evidence, being 
regarded as before the court for all legitimate purposes. 21 R. C. L., par. 
120, and cases cited. "An admission in pleading dispenses with proof, and 
is equivalent to proof." Comzectirnt Insane Hospital v. Brookfield, 69 Conn. 
l. "It is never necessary to prove what is admitted in the pleadings." 
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Smith v. Kattfmaii, 100 Ala. 4o8. In Roy v. King's Estate, 55 Mont. ·567, 
the plaintiff brought suit for $300. Defendant filed a general denial except 
as to $rno which he admitted he owed plaintiff. Plaintiff introduced evidence 
and was nonsuited. Upon appeal it was held that plaintiff should have 
received judgment for $100, for the admission in the answer that part of 
the plaintiff's claim was justly due entitled plaintiff to judgment for that 
amount, without regard to the value of the evidence as to the balance. The 
principal case is supported by prior decisions of the same court, but it is 
clearly out of line with the weight of authority which permits the trial to 
proceed with the admissions in the pleading, and gives the plaintiff judg-
ment for the amount admitted, leaving the question as to the balance to 
the jury. 
PLEADING-EQUITABLE REPLY TO LEGAL DEFSNSE.-A federal statute 
(ACT oF MARCH 3, 1915; Jun: ConE, § 274b; CoM. ST., § 1251b) provides 
"that in all actions at law equitable defenses may be interposed by answer, 
plea or replication without the necessity of filing a bill on the equity side 
of the court." Plaintiff sued at law on a contract for commissions, to which 
the defendant pleaded a settlement and release. To this the plaintiff replied 
fraud by defendant in procuring the release, and tendered back the amount 
received in the settlement. On a demurrer to this replication defendant 
urged that it was not authorized and the fraud should have been availed 
of by a bill in equity to set aside the release. Held, that the replication was 
good. Plews v. Burrage (C. C. A., 1st Cir., 1921), 274 Fed. 881. 
This opinion seems to be in accordance with the very language of the 
statute above quoted. But there is another sentence in the same section 
which provides that "in case affirmative relief is prayed in such answer or 
plea the plaintiff may file a replication." If this means that no replication 
can be filed unless the plea or answer prays aflj.rmative relief, then such a 
replication as that in the principal case is unauthorized because the answer 
there contained a mere defense. In Keatley v. U. S. Trust Co. (C. C. A., 
2nd Cir., 1918), 249 Fed. 2g6, the court took this latter view and held that 
a replication exactly like the one in the principal case was bad. We thus 
have two opposite decisions on the same question, due to the emphasizing 
of two different features of the same statute. The Pleu.•s case emphasized 
the liberal provision, which was intended to prevent circuity of action. 
The Keatley case emphasized the conservative provision which impliedly 
restricted the use of a replication to cases where affirmative relief was asked 
for in the plea or answer. North Carolina, in the Cons of 1883, § 245, gave 
a defendant the right "to set forth by answer as many defenses and counter-
. claims as he may have, whether they be such as have been theretofore denom-
inated legal, equitable, or both,'' and a plaintiff in his reply "to allege * * * 
any new matter not inconsistent with the complaint, constituting a defense 
to new matter in the answer." This has been held broad enough to allow 
an equitable reply to a legal defense, conformably to the spirit of pro-
cedural reform manifested in codes of pleading. Bean v. R. R., 107 N. C. 
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731. It is interesting to note that the court which rendered the conservative 
opinion, contrary to the general spirit of the Code, sat in New York, a 
code state, while the liberal view was announced in the New England cir-
cuit, which has generally retained the common law procedure. Possibly this 
whole discussion in these federal cases was unnecessary, for it has fre-
quently been held, in the absence of any statute whatever, that such a repli-
cation raises a perfectly good issue in an action at law. M'He11ry v. M'Henry 
& Co., 14 Leg. Int. 292 (Pa.); Friedburg v. Knight, 14 R. I. 585; Piper v. 
B. & M. R.R., 75 N. H. 228; U. P. Ry. Co. v. Harris, 158 U. S. 326; 
Memphis St. Ry. Co. v. Giardino, n6 Tenn. 368; l CHI'fi'Y, PLEADING, *553· 
Compare Holbrook, Cabot & Rollins Corp. v. Sperling, 239 Fed. 715. On 
the general subject of equitable defenses in actions at law see "Equitable 
Defenses under Modem Codes," by E. W. Hinton, 18 MICH. L. R.Ev. 7I7. 
Quo WARRANTO-FORMER DECISION WITH DIFFERENT RELATORS RES 
ADJUDICATA.-A proceeding in the nature of quo warranto was begun in the 
name of the state on the relation of certain individuals to question the right 
of a municipal corporation to exist. The defendant city pleaded a former 
judgment in its favor, in an action commenced by different relators seeking 
dissolution of the city for similar reasons. Held, the judgment in the 
former action was res adj11dicata as to the cause of action involved in: this 
suit. Towii of Tallassee v. State (Ala.), 89 So. 5I4- · 
If the former proceedings resulted in a judgment on the merits upon 
the same subject matter, and the parties were the same in the two suits, 
the former judgment was res adjudicata in the later action. 9 ENc. PL. & 
PR. 6n. The principal case agrees with almost unanimous authority that 
in proceedings in the nature of quo u:arranto the public is the real and the 
relator a nominal party; a difference in relators then does not result in a 
difference in the real party interested in the litigation. State v. Har111011, 
31 Oh. St. 250; Wright v. Alleii, 2 Tex. I58; McClesky v. State, 4 Tex. Civ. 
App. 322; Sh1t111ate v. S1tPervisors of Fauquier Co., 84 Va. 574; State v. 
Ry. Co., 135 Ia. 6g4; State v. S1tperior Co1trt, 70 Wash. 670; State v. T¥illis, 
19 N. D. 209; Ashton v. City of Rochester, 133 N. Y. I87; City Council of 
Montgomery v. Walker, I54 Ala. 242; People v. Harriso1i, 253 Ill. 625. State 
v. Cincinnati Gas, Light and Coke Co., I8 Oh. St. 262, contra (semble). 
In a few states a claimant to public office is given a remedy analogous to 
that of q1to warra11to proceedings, but purely to test his right to the office 
as against the incumbent. 23 AM. & ENG. ENC. OF LAW (Ed. 2), 6!6, and 
cases cited. A judgment in such an action is not res adjudicata should 
another claimant attempt to exercise the same remedy or the state bring 
quo warra11to to test the occupant's right to the office. M odli1i v. State, 
I75 Ind. sn; ANN. CAs. 19I3 C 671, note. 
SALES-WHAT CoNS'l'ITUTES GooD FAITH IN PuRcHASE o:F CHATTEI.s.-
B purchased an automobile from P, giving therefor a forged check, and 
subsequently sold the car for value to D, with whom he was acquainted. 
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In response to D's inquiry B said he had· forgotten the name of his vendor, 
but would get the name if D wished. D did not insist, but if he had done 
so and had inquired from P he would have learned of the fraud. In an 
action of replevin, held, D was a bona fide purchaser and thus protected. 
Hoham v. Aukerman-T11esburg Motors (Ind., I922), I33 N. E. 507. 
That one who has a voidable title and possession of a chattel can pass 
an indefeasible title to a bona fide purchaser seems well settled. Trnxton 
v. Fait & Slagle Co., I Pennewill (Del.) 483; 9 MICH. L. RI>v. 239, note. 
But what constitutes good faith is more or less undetermined. Under the 
Uniform Sales Act, § 76 (not in force in Indiana), a thing is done in good 
faith when it is in fact done honestly, whether it be done negligently or 
not. With this indication of the legislative attitude toward good faith, per-
haps one should not quarrel with a court which reaches the same conclusion. 
The distinction between what a purchaser knows and what he ought to 
!mow is pointed out in Pierce v. O'Brien, I89 Mass. 58. In the instant case 
there is no discussion of the matter, merely the bald assumption that the 
purchase was bona fide. In view of the large number of cars which are 
stolen daily it would seem that a buyer might well be put on inquiry by the 
sudden lapse of memory of his vendor as to where he obtained the car. 
Circumstances which would lead a prudent man to suspect an adverse claim 
will prevent a transaction from being bona fide. Pringle v. Phillips, 5 Sand£. 
(7 N. Y. Super.) I57· Whether there were such circumstances would seem 
to be a question of fact for the jury. See W:rr.r.ISTON ON SAI.'ES, § 62I; 
]ONES ON 'l'HE PosI'tION AND RIGHTS OF A BONA FIDE PURCHAS'ER FOR VAI.UE 
QF GOODS !MPROPERI.Y QB'l'AINED. 
TAXATION-STOCK DIVID'ENDS NOT T AXABI.E AS !NCOME.-Large profits· 
of X corporation were capitalized and bonus stock issued to Blott and other 
stockholders. Held (two Lords dissenting), that such "stock dividends" 
were not taxable as "income" to stockholders under Finance Act, I9IO. 
Inland Revemie Commissioners v. Blott [I92I], 2 A. C. I7I. 
If the thing distributed consisted of stock in another corporation it is 
clear that such "stock dividends" would be taxed as "income." Peabody v. 
Eisner, 247 U. S. 347; State v. Lee, I72 Wis. 38I. And the same result was 
reached in a very recent case where the shares of a new corporation were 
distributed to stockholders of the old under a transaction which was a 
mere financial reorganization of the corporation's business. U. S. v. Phellis 
(Nov. 2I, I92I), 42 Sup. Ct. 63. The principal case accords with the leading 
Americaµ decision in point. Eis1ier v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 18"9 (four judges 
dissenting). Both cases apparently take the view that a "stock dividend" 
paid pursuant to a capitalization of profits is not "income" to the person 
receiving such dividend. The writers of the three prevailing opinions in the 
principal case considered the reasoning in Eisner v. Macomber, s11pra, rele-
vant, but relied 'upon the case of Bouch v. Sproule (I877), 12 A. C. 385, 
which decided that as between life tenant and remainderman the latter was 
entitled to a stock dividend. The American decisions have not considered 
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that type of case to be in point. In Massachusetts it has been held that as 
between life tenant and remainderman "stock dividends" go to the latter, 
~Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. IOI; but for the purpose of taxation they will be 
regarded as "income." Tax Commissioner v. P1,tna11i, 227 Mass. 522. Swan 
Brewery Co.,. Ltd., v. T!~e King [I9I4], A. C. 23I, which presented· the 
problem of the principal case, was distinguished on the ground that the 
Western Australian Act there involved was broader than the Finance Act 
of l9IO, but in dissenting Lord Sumner pointed out that the language of the 
Swan Brewery case was applicable to the instant case. Eisner v. lYfacomber, 
s11pra, has been criticised both favorably and adversely. 18 MICH. L. ~v. 
689; 33 HARV. L. ~\T. 885 et seq. See also 20 MrcH. L. ~v. 56o for a 
recent Massachusetts decision contra the principal case. Parliament could pass 
an income tax law broad enough to reach "stock dividends." With us the 
problem is more difficult, for Eis1ier v. Macomber decided· that a federal 
income tax law designed to reach "stock dividends" was unconstitutional in 
that the word "income" as used in the Sixteenth Amendment was not broad 
enough to include "stock dividends." 
ToRT-INDUCING BREACH oF CoNTRAcr-UNINCORPORA'tl!D UNION CHARGE-
ABI.E FOR Acrs oF ITS FINANCIAI. S!!CRl!'l'ARY.-Complainant hired employees 
only on condition that they should not belong to or join labor unions while 
in its employ. With knowledge of this, defendant's financial secretary directed 
a campaign of picketing, solicitation accompanied with threats, and in some 
cases actual violence, with aim eventually to unionize complainant's shop. 
In a suit for an injunction, brought against the union local, defendant denied 
the representative capacity of the secretary, and he professed to have acted 
as an individual unionist. Held, granting injunction, defendant union is 
chargeable for the acts of its financial secretary. Gyms Currier & So11-s v. 
International Molders' U11io1i of North America, Local No. 40 (N. ]., 
Ig2I)' IIS Atl. 66. 
In the absence of statute an unincorporated labor union cannot sue or 
be sued in its common name. MARTIN, THE MODERN LAW OF LABOR UNIONS, 
§ 214; Diamond Block Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, I88 
Ky. 477. Statutes in the various states have generally modified this rule, 
some authorizing actions by or against officers of unincorporated associations 
in a representative capacity, the judgment binding all members as a class. 
Tracy v. Banker, 170 Mass. 266; Russell & Sons v. Stampers & Gold Leaf 
Local U11io1i, 107 N. Y. Supp. 303. The New Jersey statute provides that 
unincorporated associations may be sued in their recognized names, that 
papers may be served on the president or other officer in charge, and that 
such action shall have the same effect as if prosecuted against all members. 
The precise point involved in the instant case could arise only under statutes 
of the latter type, and does not appear to have been decided heretofore. The 
defendant in its answer adopted most of the activities of the secretary as 
having been carried on in its behalf, but denied legal liability therefor. The 
court, however, said: "The defendant local is an unincorporated organiza-
tion of men-a copartnership-bound together for the attainment of worthy 
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objects, sometimes, unfortunately, sought to be obtained by unworthy means, 
and in the prosecution of their common object the action of any one member 
is binding upon all." For a somewhat similar decision under the English 
Trade Union Acts see The Taff Vale Railway Co. v. The Amalgamated 
Society of Railway Servants, L. R. [1901], A. C. 426. For dictm1i contra 
see Diamond Block Coal Co. v. United Mi11e Workers of America, supra. 
As to the general right to injunction to restrain a third party from inducing 
a breach of employment see Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 38 
Sup. Ct. 65, commented' on in 16 MICH. L. Rtv. 250, article in 2'J YALE L. J. 
779; Eagle Glass & Mfg. Co. v. R()we, 38 Sup. Ct. 80; McMichael v. Atlanta 
Envelope Co., 151 Ga. 776. 
TRADE NA:MES-DE5CRIPrIVE WoRDS.-Plaintiff, as owner of a business 
conducted under the name Active Transfer Co. and Active Parcel Delivery, 
sued to enjoin defendants from using the names Action Transfer Co. and 
Action Parcel Delivery. Held, an injunction was properly granted. Jaynes 
v. Weickman {Cal., 1921-), 203 Pac. 828. 
After holding ·the similarity of "action" with "active" to be such as 
would deceive the public, the court declared the adjective "active" not to 
be descriptive when used in relation to a transfer and parcel delivery com-
-pany. It was "sufficiently fanciful" to entitle plaintiff "to· protect the use 
as a trade name of the phrase of which it is a part." This distinction is 
illustrated by the two cases, Scriven v. North, 124 Fed. 894, and Globe-
W ernicke Co. v. Brow~, 121 Fed. 185, holding respectively that "elastic" 
was descriptive as applied to drawers, but fanciful as applied to book-cases. 
The narrow line of distinction is shown by comparison of the principal case 
with the following decisions that the adjectives concerned were descriptive 
and the phrase was not pre-emptible: "Instantaneous Tapioca," Bennett v. 
McKinley, 65 Fed. 505; "Imperial Beer,'' Beadleston v. Cooke Brewing Co., 
74 Fed. 229; "Continental Insurance,'' Continental Ins. Co. v. Continental• 
Fire Assn., g6 Fed. 846; "Ever-ready Coffee Mills,'' United States v. Bronson 
Co., 17 App. D. C. 471; "Gold Medal·Saleratus,'' Taylor v. Gillies, 59 N. Y. 
331 ; "Snowflake Bread,'' Larrabee v. Lewis, 67 Ga. 561; "Health Preserving 
Corsets,'' Ball v. Siegel, n6 Ill. 137; "Favorite Letter File,'' Cooke & Cobb 
Co. v. Miller, 65 N. Y. S. 730; "Lath.er Kreem Shaving Compound,'' Krank 
Mfg. Co. v. Pabst, 277 Fed. 15. If the court in the principal case had been 
bothered by these precedents it might have rendered the same decree while 
saying: "We are of the opinion that the complainants have failed to estab-
lish a valid technical trade ·mark; but inasmuch as the testimony shows 
unfair competition, which entitles them to an injunction, it is deemed unnec-
essary to discuss the distinctions which seein to differentiate this case * * *." 
Scriven v. North, 134 Fed. 366, 38o. 
TRIALS-IGNORANCE AND INCOMPE'!ENCE OF ATTORNEY AS GROUND FOR NEW 
TRIAL.-Defendant was charged with taking indecent liberties with a twelve-
year-old girl. At the trial the defendant's attorney sought to show that all 
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of the prosecution's witnesses had made statements out of court as to what 
occurred which were at variance with their testimony at the trial. Defend-
ant's attorney was ignorant as to the proper method of laying the foundation 
for this impeaching testimony and so it was excluded. Held, a new trial 
should be granted: in order that the defendant might have an opportunity 
to present the proof in a proper way. People v. Scliul111a1i (Ill., 1921), 132 
N. E. 530. . 
It is a general rule that, upon the principles of agency, a client is bound 
by the acts of his attorney. Thus, it has been held that the client is liable 
in damages for the misconduct of his attorney at the trial. Eshelman v. 
RaUJalt, 298 Ill. 192. In Hambrick v. Crawford, 55 Ga. 335, equity refused 
to enjoin a judgment obtained when the defendant's attorney used only one 
defense which proved insufficient when the defendant had in fact several 
defenses. For a coliection of cases, see 9 L. R. A. (n. s.) 524. The rule 
in New York, however, is contrary to the general rule and in accord with 
the rule of the principal case. The New York cases hold· that a new trial 
may be granted when a client is injured by the neglect or ignorance of his 
attorney. Sharp v. Mayor of New York, 31 Barb. 578; Elsto1i v. Schilling, 
30 N. Y. Sup. Ct 74- This doctrine has been characterized as showing "a 
fine spirit of humanity," but having "little regard for the settled principles 
of law." BI.ACK ON JUDGMENTS,§ 376. 
ThuSTS-CHARITIES-"~ACHING OF THE GoSPEI.."-A testator directed 
that one-half of his residuary estate be paid to trustees and that they direct 
the use of the money for the purpose of "evangelization" and "in the preach-
ing of the gospel as may to th~m seem best." Against the contention that 
it was too indefinite, it was held a valid charitable trust. Rhodes v. Yater 
(N. M., 1921), 202 Pac. 6g8. 
The advancement of religion has been held charitable both before and 
after the Statute 43 Eliz., c. 4 (16o1), which only referred: to the "repair of 
churches" in enumerating charitable purposes. 2 PERRY, TRUSTS (Ed. 3), 
§ 701. While indefiniteness of beneficiaries is necessary in a charitable trust, 
it is essential that a definite purpose and object be declared. A trust for 
missionary purposes in whatever field the trustee thinks best has been held 
not to fulfill this requirement. Jones v. Patterso1i, 271 Mo. 1. So also a 
bequest for the Lord's work, !tu re Compton's Will, 131 N. Y. S. 183; and 
for the propagation of the gospel in foreign lands, Carpenter v. Miller's 
Errs, 3 W. Va. 174. On the other hand, it has been held that a trust for 
the spread of the gospel was sufficiently definite. In re Lea, L. R. 34 Ch. 
528; Att'y General v. Wallace's Devisees, 46 Ky. 6n. Trusts for the advance-
ment of the Christian religion, Miller v. Teachoi&t, 24 Ohio St. 525; for 
employing evangelists, Greer v. Synod, Southern Presbyterimi Church, 150 
Ky. 155; for such religious purposes as the trustees may think fit, Going v. 
Emery, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 107, and for extending the religion of Christian. 
Science as taught by the testator, Cltase v. Dickey, 212 Mass. 555, have been 
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upheld. As the cases indicate, it is quite impossible to harmonize the hold-
ings or to formulate a rule by which it may be judged whether such a trust 
is too indefinite. The principal case is one of first impression in New Mexico 
and would seem correctly decided. This is especially so in view of the fact 
that the trustees were willing to act and a discretion had been vested in 
them as a means for making the trust more certain. 
} 
WATJ!Jl.S AND WATER COURSES-No RIPARIAN RIGHTS IN MONTANA.-
Plaintiff owned lands through which a stream flowed; defendant, by virtue 
of an appropriation duly made, diverted all the water in the stream and used 
it for irrigation purposes. Plaintiff, claiming only as a riparian owner, 
sued to enjoin defendant's diversion of the stream on the ground that it 
was an invasion of riparian rights. Held, that the common law doctrine of 
riparian rights does not prevail in Montana, and that plaintiff's complaint 
does not state a cause of action. Mettler v. Ames Realty Co. (Mont., 19:u), 
201 Pac. 702. 
The question here decided has _long been a vexed one. There has been 
no doubt that appropriation has been legal in Montana, as in most of the 
western states, "probably from the first moment that they knew of any law," 
as Mr. Justice! Holmes says in Beaii v. Morris, 221 U. S. 485. The question 
has been whether the doctrine of riparian rights has also existed, side by 
side with the doctrine of appropriation, as in California, or whether riparian 
rights have been rejected as unsuited to the climatic conditions, as in Colo-
rado. It is remarkable that until the principal case no litigation has arisen 
in Montana which required a clear decision on the point. Earlier cases have 
~ontained dicta which support both sides. The opinion of the text-writers 
has favored the view that the California rule was applied in Montana. WIF.L, 
WATER RIGHTS (Ed. 3), § 117, includes Montana among the states which 
recognize the "combined system of appropriation and riparian rights exist-
ing side by side," stating in a footnote that "Smith v. Dennijf, 24 Mont. 20, 
had left room for doubt, but Prentice v. McKay, 38 Mont. 114 seems clear." 
LoNG (IRRIGATION, § I8) comes to the same conclusion, citing the same author-
ity. KINNEY (IRRIGATION, Ed. 2, Vol. 4, § 188o) says that the question is in 
doubt; he does not cite Prentice v. McKay, and apparently does not consider 
that it is in point. In the principal case the court takes the same view that was 
evidently taken by Mr. Kinney, and holds that Prentice v. McKay, in holding 
that riparian owners had rights which were superior to those of appropriators, 
referred only to the fact that appropriators could not trespass on riparian 
land for the purpose of initiating an appropriative right .. In other words, 
the riparian right protected by that decision was a land right, not a water 
right, and the decision was therefore not controlling in the principal case. 
In view of the fact that the riparian right to the use of water has apparently 
been completely ignored in Montana, the case is not one of very great prac-
tical importance, but it is interesting as finally determining the view of the 
court on the question involved. 
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WoRKMF.N's Coll!PF.NSATION-!NJURY ArusrnG Ou'.i.' oF EMPI.<>YMF.N'.i.'-
FAI.r, Dui" Sor.i;:r,y TO SUBJECTIVE CoNDI'.i.'ION OF W,oRKMAN.-A painter, ren-
dered temporarily unconscious by an attack of indigestion, fell from the plat-
form on which he was working to the ground eleven feet below, fracturing 
his skull. Held, an injury "arising out of the employment." Gonier v. 
Chase Companies (Conn., 1921), IIS Atl. 677. 
There is some authority for the view that an injury from a fall caused 
solely by the subjective condition of the workman, existing independently 
of the occupation, is an injury "arising out of the employment." Wicks v. 
Dowell & Co., [1905] z K. B. Div. 2251 (workman, seized by an epileptic fit, 
fell into the hold of a ship); Wright & Greig, Ltd., v. M'Ke11dry, (1918) 56 
Scot. L. Rep. 39 (employee suffered an uraemic fit, and fell upon the slightly 
sloping concrete floor of the store in which he worked) ; Williams v. Lla11-
d11d110 Coaching and Carriage Co., [1915] 31 Times L. Rep. 186 (stableman, 
because of his intoxication, fell from a ladder); Fraser v. John Riddell & 
Co., (1913) 51 Scot. L. Rep. no (engine-driver, because of his intoxication, 
fell off the footplate_ of his engine). Recovery was allowed in these cases 
on the ground that the injury was due to perils peculiar to the employment. 
But a greater number of courts have held that such an injury does not 
"arise out of the employment," even where, admittedly, it arises "within 
the course of employment." Collins v. Brookly1i Union Gas Co., 156 N. Y. 
Supp. 957 (workman, while sweepiilg, had an attack of cardiac syncope, and 
fell, fracturing his skull); Joseph v. United Kimono Co., 185 N. Y. Supp. 
700 (fall from window due to attack of vertigo or headache); Cox v. Refi11illg 
Co., lo8 Kan. 320 (fall due to epileptic fit); Vmi Gorder v. Packard Motor 
Car Co., 195 Mich. 588 (epileptic fit); Brooker v. Industrial Acc. Com., 176 
Cal. 275 (epileptic fit). There are English cases in accord: Frith v. Owners 
of S. S. Louisianian, [1912] 2 K. B. Div. 155 (sailor, because of intoxicated 
condition, fell overboard); Nash v. Owners of S. S. Rangatira, [1914] 3 K. 
B. Div. 978 (sailor, attempting to board his vessel while intoxicated, fell off 
the gangplank); Butler v. B11rto11-01i-Trrnt Union, (1912) 106 L. T. R. 824 
(workman, suffering from tuberculosis, was seized with a fit of coughing, 
became dizzy and fell down a flight of steps). The courts universally declare 
that an injury "arises out of the employment" only when there is a causal 
relation between the injury and the employment. Regarding injuries "arising 
out of the employment," see 16 MICH. L. REv. 179, 462; 18 id. 162; 19 id. 456, 
577, 669. 
